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THE STATUS OF MARRIED WOMEN UNDER THE
LEGAL SYSTEM OF SPAIN
Lucy A. Sponsler*
INTRODUCTION
Few people will be surprised to learn that the legal rights of
women in Spain were, until recently, extremely restricted. The Roman,
Visigothic, Jewish, Arabic and Catholic influences during Spain's long
history had combined to make the Spanish woman one of the most sub-
ordinated in all of Europe. The object of the present study is to ex-
amine the status of Spanish women, both single and married, in the
past versions of the Civil Code of Spain (first promulgated in 1889)
as well as in the light of the most recent legal changes. Rather than
a detailed examination of all of Spanish law dealing with women, the
emphasis will be placed on those major areas in the Spanish codes
which have long been restrictive and which lately have undergone
broad revisions. These areas include marriage, divorce, wills and in-
heritance, guardianship, adoption and remarriage.
Prior to fairly recent moves in the direction of women's rights,
the only important legal changes in this area during the twentieth
century in Spain came in the 1930s. In a number of Western Euro-
pean countries during this period there was a movement in the direc-
tion of equalizing the rights of the sexes.' This was the era of Spain's
Second Republic, which immediately preceded her Civil War and the
rise of Generalissimo Franco. In the early 1930s the Constitution of
the new Spanish Republic gave extensive rights to women. It also
provided, among other things, for civil marriage and divorce.' These
provisions, however, were eliminated in 1938 during the post-Civil War
period.
Under the influence of changes throughout Western Europe, Latin
America and parts of Asia, serious reforms were begun in the area
of Spanish women's rights with the Law of April 24, 1958. Even with
these important revisions, the Civil Code maintained the wifely duty
of obedience and the need for the husband's permission in the event
that she wished to act on her own. The "ancien r gime" continued
to exist on the basis that marriage was a special case in which, because
of the exigencies of marital unity and the need to better achieve its
* Associate Professor of Spanish, University of New Orleans,
1. 1 J. M. MANRESA Y NAVARRO, COMENTARIOS AL CMoIGo CIVIL ESPAI40L 412 (7th
ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as I MANRESA Y NAVARRO].
2. The significant provisions were added by way of amendments in 1932. Id. at 516.
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moral and social ends, religion and history had given the directing
power to the husband.'
In the past two decades life for Spanish women has changed
dramatically. Unmarried young women are migrating to the cities to
work or study, living in apartments with other girls rather than follow-
ing the traditional pattern of remaining in their hometowns with their
own families. Women are entering professions populated primarily by
men. Medicine, now almost completely socialized, is less attractive to
men than formerly, since other fields are more lucrative. Now approx.-
imately 40% of Spanish medical students are women. Research posi-
tions, also not well paid, are being filled by women, as men dominate
engineering, a field which is more profitable. Many women still become
secretaries, for they can earn money quickly in this way and provide
a nest egg for marriage. Nonetheless, more and more women are at-
tending universities. A special group of universities, called the Univer-
sidades laborales, is maintained by workers' unions whose members'
children attend free of charge. Previously in these schools the sexes
had been separated, but now the universities are coeducational with
more and more scholarships for women.
Influenced by changes in women's status elsewhere in the world,
as well as by new trends in the lives of women within their own coun-
try, a number of Spanish female attorneys and women active in politics
became dissatisfied enough with the submissive legal position of
women in Spain, particularly that of wives, to move for major legal
changes in the early 1970s. Originally they had hoped to work out
an entirely new series of laws regarding marriage, beginning with
a new Ley de Bases, or fundamental law, which would have changed
totally the rights of partners within a marriage. They were faced,
however, with the preamble to the civil code changes made in 1958
which declared wives to be still subject to their husbands' authority:
"Because of the demand of matrimonial unity there exists a power
of direction which nature, religion and history attribute to the
husband."' Although the 1958 changes had improved the status of
women, granting them the capacity to witness wills and to be guard-
ians, while also giving them equal rights and responsibilities with men
in matters concerning judicial separation, the economic regime of mar-
3. J. L. LACRUZ BERDEJO, EL NUEVO DERECHO CIVIL DE LA MUJER CASADA 13-14 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Lucauz BERDEJO].
4. J. CORTEZO, LA SITUACION JURiDICA DE LA MUJER CASADA (1975) [hereinafter cited
as CORTEZO]. The Spanish wording of this provision is: "Por exiflencia de la unidad
matrimonial, existe una potestad de direcci6n, que la naturaleza, ta religi6n y la historia
atribuyen at marido." For this and all subsequent quotations from the Spanish, the
English translations appearing in the text of this article will be those of the author
and the original Spanish will be found in the footnotes.
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riage was still as it had been; husbands had administrative control
of the community property.5
The Spanish government, led by Generalissimo Franco in the early
1970s, did not wish for such a major action as a new basic law. It
did consent, however, to forming a Commission charged with revis-
ing, article by article, the portions of the Civil Code dealing with mar-
riage. Four women were among those appointed to the Commission,
the first time women have ever been included in such a body in Spain.
The Commission began its work in 1972, and the first results of its
labor were promulgated in the Law of May 2, 1975, during the Inter-
national Women's Year. Aiming at homogeneity with Western Europe,
the Commission members rewrote articles of the Civil Code and the
Commercial Code in an attempt to make a wife's rights equal to those
of her husband and to alter her obligation to obey and frequently
seek .his permission to act. In much of its work the Commission was
able to rely on local laws called fueros,6 for their laws were often more
favorable to women than those of the Code Napoleon, which served
as a basis for much of the Civil Code of Spain.
The primary changes of 1975 relate to women and marriage in
the areas of nationality, capacity and matrimonial regime. Two areas
of the husband's superiority, that is, his administration of the com-
munity property and his authority over the children, were modified
while still retaining male dominance. In 1981 other changes in these
areas further equalized the sexes. Some people, of course, believe the
Commission has gone too far, equalizing husband and wife when dif-
ferences, they feel, are justified. Some women are not well enough
educated to understand the change or simply do not care. Single
women in Spain are relatively unaffected by the revisions, since in
many ways they already had the same rights as men in terms of
freedom of action regarding property.
MARRIAGE
As early as the medieval Siete Partidas' there was an awareness
that the rights and obligations of a husband and wife were not equal
5. Id. at 54.
6. FUERO DE ARAGON; FUERO DE CATALUNA; FUERO DE NAVARRA; FUERO DE BAILEARES.
7. The Siec Patrtidas is a thirteenth-century code which followed Roman
jurisprudence. It is a series of seven books sponsored by an enlightened monarch,
Alfonso X the Wise, whose court was a center for scientific and literary studies. Alfonso
brought learned Hebrew, Arabic and Christian scholars to his court for the purpose
of continuing the diffusion of oriental knowledge through the Western world. This
was done chiefly by translating works from the languages of the scholars' specialties
into Spanish. The Partidus, resulting from Alfonso's desire to unify his realm under
one common body of laws, was also influenced by the medieval worship of the Virgin
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in Spain. King Alfonso X the Wise and his legal experts apparently
felt it necessary to justify the situation, for they explain that, after
all, marriage is called matrimony and not patrimony. (Part. IV, Tit.
II, Law II. The reason given for this "honor" to women is that a
wife has to do much more for the children than does her husband,
giving birth and then spending years raising them. Child-bearing was
the goal of marriage and hence the term matrimony, emphasizing the
mother's role in this objective. To a great extent in Spain the goal
of marriage remains the same today. This no doubt explains why it
was the husband who always had responsibility for the business and
financial aspects of the marriage. If a wife had charge of the house
and the children, of prime importance in marriage, why should she
be burdened with other things as well?
Reaching the Altar
In examining the status of married women in the Partidas as* well
as in other early Spanish codes one notices a number of unusual regula-
tions, many of which have been subsequently eliminated, but a number
of which have been continued today in strikingly similar form.
The first regulations concern the matter of getting to the altar.
The Visigothic Fuero Juzgo (654 A.D.)8 provided that a son could marry
against the advice of his parents or relatives but that if a daughter
should do so, the couple would be put under the control of a parent
(Bk. III, Tit. I, Law II). As will be seen, this extra control over a
daughter has continued well into the twentieth century under the
rubric of protection.
The Fuero Juzgo also specified that an older woman should not
marry a younger man, for their children could not grow in peace "if
born in discord" (Bk. III, Tit. I, Law IV). Nature had it, according
to the Visigothic legislators, that men should have power over women,
Mary, and is generally considered to have liberalized and improved upon the legal
rights of women. However, it did not truly liberate wives from their husbands' authority,
as shall be seen throughout this article. See III CODIGOS ESI'AFOLES (A. de San Martin
ed. 1872); LAS SIETE PARTIDAS (1256-1265).
8. The Fuero Juzgo or Liber Judiciorw.m, considered the masterpiece of Visigothic
law. was promulgated in 654 A.D. Written in Latin, it evolved during the reigns of
four Visigothic monarchs before reaching its final form. It is a blend of Roman and
Germanic law with the Roman elements particularly noticeable in the areas of in-
heritance and contracts. The code has a well-developed sense of justice, but with some
harshness and cruelty in law enforcement and treatment of slaves. On the other hand,
there is much enlightenment, particularly in the treatment of the poor, considering
the fact that the code is a product of the Dark Ages. See I CODIGOS ESPAINOLES (A.
de San Martin ed. 1872); FUERO JUZGO (654). For additional background information, see
E. N. VAN KLEFFENS, HISPANIC LAW UNTIL THE END OF THE MIDDLE AGES 74-77 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as VAN KLEFnENS1.
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so that matching an older woman and younger man was "against
nature." No subsequent mention of this regulation is to be found in
later Spanish codes.
Indeed, the Partidas seems to make a conscious effort to treat
women respectfully. It protects daughters from having their parents
arrange a marriage for them without their presence or consent (Part.
IV, Tit. I, Law X). However, since engagements could be made when
a son or daughter reached the age of seven (Part. IV, Tit. I, Law
VI), it is doubtful that a girl of that age would have had the experience
necessary to take advantage of her legal right to object.
The custom of arranged marriages eventually gave way to the
need for parental permission:to marry Until 1958 a child of age had
to wait three months before marrying if he or she was denied paren-
tal permission (Art. 47). Since then only the authorization of a local
judge has been required for the marriage to proceed. However, if a
couple marry without permission, the economic regime to be followed
is a separation of property with no dowry being required (Art. 50).
Jos6 Maria Manresa y Navarro, a principal commentator on the Civil
Code in the 1950s, indicates that this regulation stems from a desire
to protect the family property of the girl from mistakes of a "pas-
sionate nature." Since society viewed women as more passionate than
men, more impressionable and less thoughtful, a girl might become
blindly infatuated with an able seducer." If the system of community
property is not followed, the property of both families is protected.
Another restriction indirectly related to marriage and aimed solely
at women was in effect until 1972. According to article 321 of the
Civil Code, a daughter reached her majority at the age of twenty-one
but was not allowed to leave her parents' home without their permis-
sion except to marry, to enter an order or to avoid mistreatment.
A son, on the other hand, was under no such restrictions. As of July
22, 1972 this portion of article 321 has been stricken. Additionally,
as of November 16, 1978 majority is now reached at age eighteen
(Art. 320).
Several further situations impeding marriage were devised in the
early codes and have been continued in similar form up to the pre-
sent. In the Fuero Juzgo most of these dealt solely with women; among
them were prohibitions on marrying again before one's first husband
was buried and on marrying before the passage of a year of mourn-
ing (Bk. II, Tit. II, Laws VI, I). A one-year prohibition on the remar-
riage of a widow was retained in the Partidas (Part. VII, Tit. VI, Law
9. ComIco civii. arts. 45-50 (1980). The full text of superseded articles referred to
throughout this work can be found in the 1978 edition of the C6d'iqg cii,l.
10. 1 MANRESA Y NAVARRO. supra n. 1, at 419.
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III), and the reasons were clearly spelled out. First, permission to
remarry would provide the motivation for a wife to do away with
her husband. (This same woman, who at other points in the Code is
viewed as helpless and weak, is now suspected of conniving to murder.)
Secondly, there would be a problem of determining the father of a
child who might be born subsequently. For these reasons it was il-
legal for any man to make a widow his heiress if she married before
the year of mourning was up (Part. VI, Tit. III, Law V). It is clear
that, regarding the determination of paternity, women are singled out
in this provision solely because only they can bear children. However,
it seems justified to question why a man would not have been suspect
in similar circumstances if he should marry before a year of mourn-
ing was over.
The Ordenanzas Reales (1485)" annulled this restriction on remar-
riage, but it reappeared in the Code of 1888," and is continued in the
present Code. Article 45 prevents a widow from marrying until 300
days after the death of her husband or until after she gives birth,
if pregnant.
One further impediment to marriage first appears in the Partidas.
Among those not permitted to marry was any man castrated or lack-
ing "some members necessary for engendering.""3 By way of explana-
tion, a subsequent article states that such a man "would not be capable
of fulfilling his carnal obligation to his wife."" Here is further evidence
that children were the goal of marriage, since marriage is forbidden
when it is clear that no children can be conceived. The fact that a
single woman might wish to marry such a man, or indeed that a widow
with children might want to do so, is ignored. The goal of having children
still affects today's similar law. Article 83 of the Civil Code forbids
the impotent from marrying despite the desires of the partner involv-
ed. Of course one would doubt that there is much vigorous enforce-
ment of that provision..
11. The Ordenanzas Reales, also called the Ordenamiento Real, came into being
during the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella as an eight-volume collection of existing
laws which it was felt were worth keeping in force. A confused, contradictory series
of overlapping laws had been produced by the successors of Alfonso X the Wise, and
the Ordenanzas Reales were compiled to "separate the chaff from the grain." See VAN
KLEFFENS, supra n. 7, at 230-31;
12. I MANRESA Y NAVARRO, supra n. 1. at 424.
13. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS Bk. IV, Tit. II, L. VI: "Que le menguassen acquellos miem-
bros que son menester para engendrar."
14. LAS SIaTE PARTIDAS Bk. IV, Tit. VIII, L. IV: "Non podria complir a su muger
el debdo carnal."
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Rights of Marriage Partners
It is primarily articles 57-65 of the Spanish Civil Code which deal
with the rights of marriage partners. In May of 1975 major changes
in these and several other articles were enacted by the Cortes (parlia-
ment) in Madrid. The main thrust of the new legislation is to assure
that marriage does not unnecessarily restrict the actions of either part-
ner. To appreciate the importance of this goal one must be aware
of the legal limitations on a wife contained in these articles of the
Code prior to the 1975 changes.
In general, the duty of a husband was to protect, and that of his
wife was to obey. Women were considered the weaker sex, needing
protection from their own passions and poor judgment. A Spanish wife
had to change her nationality to that of her 'husband if she married
a foreigner, and in any case she had to follow her husband and live
where he did, whether he was a foreigner or not. Only if he moved
abroad did she have judicial recourse. Without her husband's permis-
sion a wife could not acquire property, sell it or make a contract and,
since he was her representative, she had to have his. permission to
appear in court except to defend herself in a criminal case or to bring
proceedings against him (Art. 60, prior to 1975). Women were not per-
mitted to be guardians nor to witness wills except in cases of epidemic
(Art. 237, prior to 1958). They were classed with minors, the blind,
deaf mutes and the insane in being prevented from serving as
witnesses (Arts. 681, 701, prior to 1958) and they were also preventd
from making gifts or contributions, because only those who could con-
tract and dispose freely of their property could do so (Art. 624, prior
to 1975). Without their husbands' permission wives could not contract
or dispose freely of their property. Indeed, the Code specifically listed
only two things that a wife could do without her husband's permis-
sion: (1) make a will and (2) exercise the rights and fulfill the duties
which fell to her with respect to the children she might have had
by another man and with respect to the property of these children
(Art. 63, prior to 1975).
One should not conclude that these restrictions were in existence
solely because it was believed that women were incapable of manag-
ing in the world. After all, single women were given great freedom
in the areas where married women were so restricted.'" Surely it was
not felt that marriage immediately weakened a woman's faculties. The
explanation lies in the duty of the husband to protect his wife (he
could, after all, be held responsible for her errors, while she was not
15. I MANRESA Y NAVARRO, supra n. 1, at 487.
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obliged for his debts when mistakes were made) and in his duty to
protect the interests of the marriage from the consequences of a wife's
inexperience.'" Of course, part of the reason for her inexperience was
simply lack of opportunity. It was not deemed necessary to have
similar protection for single women!
In his major edition and commentary on the Civil Code in 1956,
Manresa discussed what he felt was the offensiveness to women of.
some of the restrictions enumerated above. 7 Although wives were
given a bit more say in their husbands' actions regarding the wives'
property in the early years of this century,"6 Manresa still maintained
that sometimes the duty of the wife to obey her husband, to live where
he lived, the fact that she was prevented from co-participation in the
patria potestad (control over one's children) and the fact that the com-
mon property of the marriage was controlled by the husband might
actually be inhumane at times. Although there were some changes
regarding the rights of women in 1958, soon after the publication of
Manresa's twelve-volume commentary, it was not until 1975, some
twenty years later, that most of his criticisms were acted upon.
The 1975 change in article 57 symbolizes the tenor of all the other
changes. While the former version specifically stated that the hus-
band's duty was to protect the wife and the wife's to obey her hus-
band, the new version states that husband and wife owe each other
respect and mutual protection, thus eliminating the discriminatory
situation in which the husband was ruler and the wife follower." Ad-
ditionally, a woman marrying a foreigner is now permitted to keep
her Spanish citizenship (Art. 21, as of 1975). Along similar lines, a
wife now has equal participation with her husband in determining their
place of residence (Art. 25, as of 1975).
In the areas of a wife's right to act on her own, one which was
previously negligible, several major restrictions have been lifted.
Former article 60 provided that a husband was his wife's represen-
tative and that she needed his permission to appear in court. Former
article 61 continued in the same vein, stating that without the hus-
band's permission she could not acquire property by purchase or dona-
tion nor could she sell her property nor make any commitments except
under the limitations established by law. Furthermore, former article
16. Id. at 486-87.
17. Id. at 488, 511-12.
18. Id. at 488.
19. Jos6 Luis Lacruz Berdejo, a Professor of Law at the University of Saragossa
in Spain. points out that this new situation will create more problems in resolving
divergences of opinion between husband and wife. What formerly was resolved by
the husband will now be brought before a tribunal. LACRUZ BERDEJO, supra n. 3, at
13-14.
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62 provided that any actions by the wife not in keeping with these
legal regulations, except those relating to the family's daily consump-
tion, would be null and void. This article even went so far as to state
specifically that any purchases of jewelry, furniture or precious ob-
jects made by a wife without her husband's permission would only
become valid upon his consent.
It is clear, then, that except in the case of ordinary family expend-
itures, such as food or clothing, a wife did not have the legal capacity
to act without her husband's permission. Major changes providing
equal rights for husband and wife have been made in articles 61-65.
Revised article 62 states that marriage does not restrict the capacity
of either marriage partner. In addition, revised article 63, which con-
tradicts former article 60, provides that neither marriage partner can
represent the other unless this right has been conferred voluntarily.
Thus a wife is now free to carry out legal acts and appear in court
without first securing her husband's permission. Futhermore, former
article 62 has been eliminated, so that a wife's acts are not declared
null and void merely because she did not get her husband's permis-
sion first. Since many actions now require the consent of one spouse
before the other can act (rather than requiring only the husband's
permission) revised article 65 provides that those actions carried out
without such consent can be nullified at the insistence of the spouse
whose consent was absent.
A word is necessary here on the matter of permission and con-
sent. The new changes have totally omitted the words husband's per-
mission in favor of the term consent with respect to the spouse who
did not initiate the particular action in question. One must wonder
whether or not there is any real difference between the words per-
mission and consent.' Surely, "consent" is a bit softer, but the real
significance of the 1975 changes lies not in a change in those words
but rather in the fact that now the consent must be mutual, instead
of always being secured by the wife from the husband.
A final group of 1975 changes deals with restrictions upon wives
in the making of contracts and related matters. This issue did not
make its appearance in Spanish law until the Renaissance. In the Leyes
de Toro (1505)" one finds a provision that during marriage a woman
20.. According to Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, "permission" is equivalent
to formal consent or authorization, while synonyms for "consent" are "assent" or "ap-
proval." WERSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1951) s.v. "Permission,"
"Consent." '
21. In the Lcyes de Toro (1505) an attempt was made to eliminate the disputes
constantly arising over the interpretation of the different codes in existence at that
time. The Leyes, also compiled during the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, is a collec-
tion of eighty-three laws rather than a complete, ordered, methodical code such as
16071982]
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could not make any contract without her husband's permission (Law
XV), although if he refused, she could seek permission from a judge
(Law XVII). Her husband could also ratify any contract made by his
wife without his permission (Law LVIII). The Novisima Recopilaci6n
(1805)2" carried forward the same provisions (Bk. X, Tit. I, Laws XI,
XII), and only in May of 1975 was the C6digo civil changed so that
married women could make a contract without anyone's permission
(Art. 1263, as of 1975).
In a related area married women had been included among minors,
the insane, the demented and deaf mutes, a group considered as phy-
sically or mentally lacking the normal faculties necessary for the
capacity to contract. However, now that a wife can make contracts,
another restriction has been lifted. She no longer needs her husband's
permission to be an executrix (Art. 893, as of 1975), for under the
Spanish Code only those granted the capacity to contract are permit-
ted to be executors of wills.
Regarding the acceptance of an inheritance, restrictions upon
wives began in the Leyes de Toro (Law V) and were continued through
the Novisima Recopilaci6n (Bk. X, Tit. XX, Law X). In these codes
a wife was permitted to accept any inheritance without the permis-
sion of her husband, but she could not reject one without such per-
mission. Apparently this slight degree of autonomy turned out to be
dangerous in the opinion of the lawmakers, for in the twentieth-century
version, until 1975, a wife could no longer even accept an inheritance
without permission; and, if the permission should be that of a judge,
then only her separate property and her share of the community would
be liable in the case of succession debts (Art. 995, prior to 1975). As
of 1975 the need for such permission has been omitted in this article.
In the revision, if an inheritance is accepted by a married person
without the benefit of inventory, and if the other spouse does not
the Fuero Juzgo or the Siete Partidas. It did, however, fix the order of preference
of the extant codes. According to Jamie Cortezo, this group of laws is considered to
be particularly one-sided concerning the incapacity of married women. CORTEZO, supra
n. 4, at 43. For further background on the Ley.; de Toro, see J. ESCRICHE, DICCIONARIO
RAZONADO DE LEGISLACI6N Y JURISPRUDENCIA 1174-75 (1851) [hereinafter cited as ESCRICHEI.
For the text of the Leyes, see VI CODIOS ESPAR.OLES (A. de San Martin ed. 1872); LEYES
DE ToO (1505).
22. Part of the continuing effort to organize Spanish law in the nineteenth cen-
tury, the Notisima Recopilaci6n is a twelve-volume set which includes laws successively
promulgated after the Siete Partidas and the Fuero Real (Castilla's local laws, 1255)
plus many laws from prior codes such as the Fuero Juzgo. Unfortunately, the Novisima
Recopilacidn was no more successful than prior attempts in determining which laws
were to be followed if a conflict arose between local and state laws. For further
background, see ESCRICHE, supra n. 21, at 1418. For the text, see IX COrIGOS ESPA&OLES
(A. de San Martin ed. 1872); NOViSIMA RECOP'ILACION Bk. X, Tit. I, Ls. XI, XII (1806).
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agree to this, then the community property cannot be reached in the
case of succession debts. Thus no distinction because of sex is made.
In a related matter, formerly a married female heir who wished to
ask for the partition of a succession required to receive her husband's
or a judge's permission. Now either marriage partner can request the
partition of an inheritance without the other's concurrence (Art. 1053,
as of 1975).
Property Within Marriage: The Dowry
A long-standing tradition in Spain, the dowry consisted of the prop-
erty and rights a woman brought to the marriage at the time it was
contracted, as well as that which she might receive as a gift, in-
heritance or legacy in the nature of a dowry (Art. 1336). Provisions
for a dowry go back to the Partidas, in which it was indicated that
the dowry could be provided by the woman herself or a male relative
in her name (Part. IV, Tit. XI, Law VIII). Apparently, in efforts to
attract husbands, the size of the dowries began to get out of hand,
for the N(rvisima Recopilacion placed limits on their magnitude and
also provided that the expense of a wedding should not exceed one-
eighth of the dowry (Bk. X, Tit. III, Law VI). Until very recently
parents were still obliged to provide a dowry (Civ. Code Arts. 1340-43
(1980)). Spain was one of the few countries in the world where this
requirement persisted until the 1980s, although in fact the practice
had fallen into disuse. Instead, in recent times a girl's future in-
heritance was considered to be her dowry, and sometimes her parents
would hell) with the purchase of an apartment for the couple.' The
Law of May 13, 1981 (Arts. 1336-43)," officially ended the dowry as
a legal phenomenon in Spain.
Nonetheless the dowry is an interesting phenomenon when the
mechanics for its control are examined, for until 1981 the laws of the
modern Civil Code in Spain, except for a few recent changes, did not
differ markedly from those of the Middle Ages. In the Partidas the
husband had control over the dowry and had the right to collect any
income therefrom, although in case of judicial separation the dowry
would have to be returned (Part. IV, Tit. XI, Law VII). A wife was
protected from having her dowry wasted, for in such a case she could
demand it back (Part. IV, Tit. XI, Law XXIX). This seems to have
been a fairly considerate measure except for the unlikelihood that most
23. For this and much other information on Spanish laws and mores the author
wishes to thank Dofia Carmen Salinas, a Spanish lawyer active in the women's rights
movement in Spain and a member of the Commission which proposed the 1975 revi-
sions of the Civil Code.
24. For the text of the Law of May 13, 1981, see L. MARTINEZ-CALCERRADA, EL
NUEVO DERECHO DE LA PAMLIUA 147-86 (1981) [hereinafter cited as MA~rINEZ-CALCERRADA].
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women would have been aware of the dowry's mismanagement and
of their right to demand its return.
Between 1975 and 1981 a husband had complete control over only
a portion of his wife's dowry, for the latter was customarily divided
into two parts (Civ. Code Arts. 1346-62, from 1975 to 1981). The
"estimada" portion was handled just like the medieval dowries, for
this was the part of the dowry transferred to the husband's control
with the obligation that he restore its value to his wife in the case
of poor management or upon dissolution of the community. During
the marriage he had the right to sell or mortgage this portion of the
dowry, and he was under no obligation to restore to his wife any in-
crements in its value (Arts. 1346-49, from 1975 to 1981). The other
or "inestirnada" portion was that to which the wife retained owner-
ship, although her husband administered this property and had the
usufruct of it, normally insuring the property by bond (Arts. 1357-59,
from 1975 to 1981). The husband, however, could not sell without his
wife's consent, and any ultimate increment or deterioration in value
went to her unless the latter was the result of poor administration
(Art. 1360, from 1975 to 1981). Additionally, the husband was respon-
sible for restoring to the wife exactly the same property upon dissolu-
tion of the community. Prior to 1975, although the inestimada por-
tion of the dowry was presumably under her control, in fact a wife
could not sell or mortgage this property except with her husband's
permission (Art. 1361, prior to 1975). Between 1975 and 1981 she mere-
ly needed his consent for such action. If she did not alienate or en-
cumber the property, then her husband had to put up a bond to
guarantee its value. In a sense, then, from 1975 to 1981 the wife was
still protected from her own poor judgment, but she did not truly
have freedom of action with regard to this portion of the dowry, since
her husband's consent was required for her to act. On the other hand,
it is easy to understand why his consent was required, as it is he
who was obliged to guarantee the value of the property.
The Law of May 13, 1981 has totally eliminated all of these distinc-
tions between the powers of the husband and the wife (Art. 1346-61),
so that both parties now have the same rights in terms of control
and management of the property each brings into the marriage. In
addition, marriage contracts can be made before or modified during
the marriage in order to prevent any difficulties that might arise in
this regard."
25. Id. at 162-64.
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The Parapherna
Until the Law of May 13, 1981, the Spanish Civil Code provided
that a wife could separately own property not included in the dowry.
This property, called "bienes parafernales," which was recognized as
far back as the Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. XI, Law XVII) and was defined
as that property over which the wife retained control and administra-
tion (Civ. Code Art. 1385, prior to 1981) whether it were property
owned prior to or acquired during the marriage through inheritance,
donation or any means other than purchase.' The income for this prop-
erty became part of the community and was subject to the payment
of community debts. Even such property itself could be used to pay
daily family expenses if the community property, the husband's
separate property and the dowry were not sufficient for that pur-
pose (Art. 1385, prior to 1981).
Two 1975 changes gave the wife more control over her property.
Article 1383 was changed to state that a husband could not do any-
thing with respect to the parapherna except under his wife's power
of attorney. Previously, this article had stated that a husband could
take action concerning this property with his wife's concurrence or
consent, so that the new act now places the onus of responsibility
for a wife's separate property on her. Furthermore, article 1387 was
changed to state that a wife could dispose of her property on her
own, regardless of article 61, which would otherwise restrict this ac-
tion to a woman who had reached majority. Prior to 1975 article 1387
had prevented her from selling, mortgaging or litigating with respect
to this property absent her husband's or the court's permission.
As of 1975, then, not only did Spanish wives have more respon-
sibility for and freedom to act with respect to their parapherna, but
they still were in an advantageous position if the community should
be dissolved. Articles 1421 and 1422, which were not changed in 1975,
provided that, if an inventory of the community property were taken
at the time of its dissolution, the wife's dowry and parapherna were
to be restored to her. Only then were the debts incurred by the com-
munity paid. The fairness of such a practice was questioned by Lacruz
Berdejo,7 for if a wife could use her property as she wished, possibly
losing it in the process, why should she be entitled to its restitution,
especially before the debts of the community were paid?
The Law of May 13, 1981 totally omits the concept of "para-
pherna," treating the separate property of husband and wife in an
26. CnmzO. sprf# n. 4, at 189.
27. LACRuZ BEImDEJO, sl,' n. 3, at 100.
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identical manner. Article 1381, under this law, states that the earn-
ings of the separate property of either spouse form part of the com-
munity property and can thus be reached to satisfy a community debt.
Nonetheless, each spouse, as administrator of his or her separate prop-
erty, can dispose of the income therefrom. Thus total equality of mar-
riage partners has been provided for in the law with respect to the
administration and control of their separate property.
Community Property
The community property system was studied in Spain in the late
1970s with an eye toward giving wives co-participation in its adminis-
tration. Until 1981, although there were some enactments aimed at
giving women more responsibility, it was still the husband who had
control and administration. The community includes: (1) property pur-
chased during the marriage and paid for out of the common treasury,
whether bought for just one or for both spouses, (2) property obtained
through the work or salary of either or both partners (luring the mar-
riage and (3) any profits, income or interest received during the mar-
riage via the community property or the separate property of each
(Art. 1401, prior to 1981).
Before 1981 the rights of each spouse in regard to the community
were set forth in articles 1401-1415 of the C6digo civil. The primary
regulation was located in article 1412 which stated that the husband
administered the property except in the cases stipulated by the Code.
The wife's rights included that of disposing of her half of the property
by testament, 8 claiming her half in court should she be defrauded
by her husband, demanding her half if the marriage were dissolved
and administering the entire community should her husband be absent
or incapacitated.
Writing thirty years ago, one Spanish legal scholar praised the
system of community property as fitting well the natural aptitudes
of the sexes. According to Francisco Malo Segura, the husband has
a better aptitude for obtaining resources for family sustenance and
the wife, the ability to keep and distribute them appropriately.29
Manresa, on the other hand, criticized the system as providing a wife
no stimulus for taking an interest in the prosperity of a marriage.
If she could work and contribute to the earnings of the community,
was it not unjust that she could not participate in administering the
fruits thereofI'3
28. The Siete Partidas even allowed the husband control over his wife's testa-
ment in certain instances. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS Bk VI, Tit. V,. L. VI.
29. F. MALO SEGURA, Los DERECHOS DE LA MUJER EN LA LEGISLACION ESPAN OLA 80
(1950).
30. IX J. M. MARESA Y NAVARRO, COMENTARIOS AL CODIGO CIVIL ESPAINOL 77 (7th ed.
1956).
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Prompted, perhaps, by such criticism, there was a change in 1958
regarding the then article 1413. Prior to this change a husband could
sell or bind the property of the community without his wife's consent
(although he could not defraud her). In 1958 this article was changed
so that, although he could still sell or encumber some of the property,
he needed his wife's consent or judicial authorization to dispose of
immovables or mercantile establishments. Furthermore, if he were to
dispose of other community property in a situation of grave risk, his
wife had the right to ask a judge for protective measures. Thus a
wife had more opportunity to influence her husband's decisions regard-
ing the community property.
In 1975 a number of further revisions in the community property
law were made which attempted to put husband and wife on more
equal footing in matters of marriage and judicial separation and
divorce.3 Articles 1441-1444 were particularly restrictive of wives
when for some reason the administration of the community property
was transferred to them. In such a situation a wife was more limited
than her husband in the ability to use or dispose of the property,
for she could not sell or mortgage such property without judicial per-
mission (Art. 1444, prior to 1975). This situation was changed so that
a wife administering the community would have the same freedom
and responsibility of action as her husband when he exercised the
administration (Art. 1442, as of 1975). She was only limited in the
same manner as her husband would be; thus she needs judicial author-
ization to dispose of immovables or mercantile establishments (Arts.
1413, 1444, as of 1975).
In regard to separation from bed and board, prior to 1975 only
the party not at fault could ask for separation of property, whereas
now either spouse may do so regardless of fault, and both parties
are entitled to their shares of the property without having to prove
the presence or absence of fault (Art. 1433, as of 1975). From 1958
to 1975 article 68 provided that while the separation was pending the
husband retained administration of the community property, although
his wife was entitled to administer her separate property (or para-
pherna). Article 1436, during that same time period, did provide for
one occasion on which the administration of the community property
was transferred to the wife: if the civil interdiction of her husband
had caused the separation. This same article gave a wife administra-
tion of the dowry and of her half of the community if her husband
were absent or had caused the separation.
Changes in 1975 further advanced the rights of women in these
situations. Article 68 now provides that during a separation proceeding
31. Concerning the increase in the number of grounds for divorce made by the
1958 and 1975 legislative changes, see text at n. 32, in fra.
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each party is entitled to administer his or -her own separate property
with any prior need for the authorization or.concurrence by the other
spouse being rescinded automatically. The judge now determines which
spouse will administer the community during the separation proceed-
ing, rather than having this right assigned automatically to the
husband.
In regard to the final separation decree, prior to 1975, article 73
did not provide for a true separation of property in all cases; various
arrangments were made depending on which party was at fault. If
the husband had caused the separation, he lost the administration of
his wife's half of the community property, but if he were not at fault,
he retained this control and the wife was entitled only to support
from the community. With the 1975 change, each party, regardless
of fault or sex, has control and administration of his or her portion
of the community. However, until this law was further modified in
1981, as discussed later, only the party not at fault had the right to
support, regardless of sex. Thus there was now true separation of
property in Spain, and support depended not on sex but on fault in
causing the separation. Exactly how the court was to find that only
one party had been at fault and how that determination was to be
made was left unclear.
One further change in 1975 regarding community property and
judicial separation is of importance. Prior to that year the marital
"capitulations," that is, the marriage contract regarding property had
to be written out before marriage and could not be changed or
modified afterwards (Arts. 1320-21, prior to 1975). In 1975 article 1320
was altered so that a marriage contract can be changed or modified
at any time if the couple are of age. The effect of this change is to
make judicial separation less difficult, for if the parties wish to, they
can change their property arrangements so as to satisfy all relatives
as well as themselves, rather than being forever bound by agreements
which force the couple to stay together in order to avoid property
conflicts. New property agreements cannot, of course, extinguish any
previous debts, so that a husband or wife's portion of the community
remains liable for debts made by the other spouse prior to the new
marriage contract.
As of the 1975 changes, if a reconciliation should occur, a new
marital contract can be made (Art. 1439, as of 1975). Each spouse,
then, would reenter the marriage with some separate property which,
prior to the separation, was part of the community, plus, perhaps,
some separate property acquired during the separation. Under the
new contract the husband and wife could each retain as separate what-
ever property they might wish, even though some of it might have
been part of his or her half of the community at one time. Previously,
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a reconciliation automatically meant a resumption of the former matri-
monial regime (Art. 1439, prior to 1975).
The recent Law of May, 13, 1981 has reformed articles 1315-1444
covering the economic regime during marriage. Community property
is dealt with in articles 1344-1434 and separation of property in ar-
ticles 1435-1444. The gaps left in 1975 regarding total equalization of
husband and wife in terms of privileges and obligations have now been
filled. No longer does the husband have control over the community.
There is now equal co-participation in its creation, administration and
disposition and equal division of income and equal responsibility in
case of debt. Both spouses are free to make contracts and both are
expected to keep the other informed of any activities which affect
the community. In regard to judicial separation the 1975 changes
enumerated above have been maintained except that in regard to sup-
port there is no longer the need for the "party at fault" to support
the "innocent" one. Now there is a mutual obligation to support (Art.
143). While in practice many Spanish husbands no doubt maintain
greater control over the community property than do their wives,
perhaps now that the laws have eliminated discrimination, married
women will begin to exercise the rights they have been granted.
DIVORCE
Grounds
The concept of divorce has been recognized in Spain at least since
Roman times, but although there are medieval examples of divorce
and remarriage in Spanish literature,32 under the influence of the
Catholic church the word divorce very early came to mean separa-
tion of a married couple with no freedom to remarry. The Siete Par-
tidas, for example, used the word "departimiento" (separation) as a
synonym for divorce (Part. IV, Tit. X, Law I). For a long time true
divorce, and thus freedom to remarry, had been permitted in only
two cases in Spain. In the first case, if two non-Catholics were to
marry and one converted to Catholicism and the other tried to lure
the convert into leaving the Catholic faith, divorce was permitted,
since a marriage of two non-Catholics was considered a contract rather
than a Sacrament. The second instance was one in which two Catholics
married but did not consummate their marriage before one of the
spouses decided to enter a religious order. In such a situation the
other spouse could remarry. Otherwise, even in cases of adultery,
separation was permitted but remarriage was not."
32. In the Poem of the Cid, for example, the hero's daughters were ill-treated by
their first husbands, and after a period of accusation and restoration of honor they
eventually remarried.
33. See VII. BIBLIOTECA JURIDICA 658 (1927).
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The grounds for separation, even in the earliest codes of Spain,
have always involved some form of sexual or religious conflict. It is
also generally true that in the sexual conflicts the standards for ad-
judging men and women have been very different until quite recently.
The Fuero Juzgo specified that a man could not leave his wife
except for adultery, and in such a case neither one could marry again
(Bk. III, Tit. VI, Law II). It is of note here that adultery on the wife's
part was a ground for separation, although there is no mention of
adultery on the part of the husband. The Siete Partidas added several
grounds, for it stated that marriage could be terminated if one spouse
became a Jew, Moor or heretic or committed adultery (Part. IV, Tit.
II, Law VII). No sexual distinction was made. Furthermore, the same
law provided that a judicial separation was obtainable if the wrong
person showed up at the marriage ceremony and the marriage was
. mistake. Love may be blind, but one would normally expect this
blindness to be a hazard only with regard to the intended!
The Partidas did contain one provision for termination of the mar-
riage which was intended to be favorable to women. If a woman was
sexually "closed" and unable to have relations with her husband, and
if the marriage was therefore annulled, should she then marry again
and successfully have relations with her second husband, she would
have to be returned to her first husband! However, before the wife
was returned, her husband's "members" had to be examined to make
sure they were not so large as to create a serious danger for her.
This last provision was no doubt viewed as a protective device favor-
able to women. In actuality it is overshadowed by the rest of the
act which treats the wife much like a lost bag of groceries. There
is no provision for returning a man to his first wife if he was impo-
tent with her but not with his second.
In the modern Code recent changes concerning "divorce" were first
made in 1958. At that time the wording of all articles dealing with
the subject was changed so that only the word "separation" appeared,
although, as was explained above, there was no difference in mean-
ing, since marriage still could not be terminated in Spain except in
very limited situations. At the same time two changes which moved
toward equalizing the sexes were made in the number of grounds for
obtaining a separation. Until then the six grounds were as follows
(Art. 105, prior to 1958):
1. Adultery of the wife in all cases, and that of the husband when
it caused a public scandal or contempt for the wife;
2. Ill-treatment or serious injuries inflicted by one partner on
the other;
3. Violence exercised by the husband on his wife to force her
to change religion;
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4. Attempt by the husband to prostitute his wife;
5. Effort by the husband or wife to corrupt the children or pros-
titute the daughters and connivence in their corruption or pros-
titution;
6. Condemnation of marriage partner to a life sentence.
In 1958 the third ground for divorce was change to show recognition
of the fact that the sexes are equally capable of exercising violence
on each other, for the law was modified to state that violence by either
marriage partner in attempting to force the other partner to change
religion would be grounds for separation. Furthermore, the first
ground was changed to provide for separation when either marriage
partner committed adultery. Nolonger was there a requirement that
the husband's offense cause scandal. On the surface this would seem
to have given the sexes equality. In reality, until 1978, the Spanish
legal definition of adultery indicated otherwise.
Adultery
Until their elimination in 1978, only articles 449-452 of the Spanish
Penal Code covered the question of adultery and its consequences."
Article 449 defined adultery, stating that a married woman commit-
ted adultery if she had sexual relations with a man who was not her
husband. Thus a married woman could be charged with adultery if
she should have relations with any man, single or married, provided
that he were not her husband. A man could be charged with adultery
under two circumstances: (1) if he should have relations with a mar-
ried woman knowing that she was married and (2) if, as a married
man, he were to have continual relations with an unmarried woman
in his own home or in a notorious manner outside his home. The cir-
cumstances referred to here under the second heading are called
"amancebamiento" (concubinage). Prior to 1978, only if concubinage
were the case could a married man be punished for his sexual behavior
with an unmarried woman. Thus these definitions of adultery led to
the conclusion that a married man who spent one night with an un-
married woman "of age" could be legally accused of nothing, whereas
if his wife spent one night with an unmarried man she would be sub-
ject to the legal sanctions for adultery."
Until the elimination of this entire section from the Code different
standards were maintained for married women and married men. The
explanation for this lies in the long-standing Hispanic attitude that
the home is sacrosanct and the mother is expected to live up to her
34. For the law relating to adultery prior to 1978, see LEYES PENALES arts. 449-52
(1975). For the most recent penal laws, see CODIMO PENAL (1980).
35. The penalty was from six months and one day to six years' imprisonment.
CODIGO PENAL art. 30, prior to amendment in 1978.
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role as a symbol of purity and devotion. If her husband is disloyal
to her, people feel sorry for her, but if she betrays him, people regard
him as dishonored and ridiculous. It should be expected, therefore,
that there would be a much stricter interpretation of the factors that
constitute adultery on a wife's part than on a husband's. A Spanish
husband's honor is, after all, one of his most precious possessions.',
Examples of this greater importance being placed on a husband's
honor than on a wife's can be found as far back as the Partidas (Part.
VII, Tit. XVIIII, Law I). It is there stated that a wife could not ac-
cuse her husband of committing adultery with another man's wife,
but the right to accuse in such a situation was granted to the other
man (the adultress' husband) as well as to anyone else. The explana-
tion given in the Partidas is that an adulterer's wife is not dishonored
but that the husband of the adulteress is. An additional explanation
of this seemingly preferential treatment toward men is given as well.
The husband of an adulterous wife is in a position of greater risk
than the wife of an adulterous husband for a purely biological reason.
While a husband who has an affair cannot become pregnant, his wife
can and, if she does, the questions of paternity and inheritance arise.
A husband who philanders runs no risk of bearing an heir to compete
with his own wife and children. Such an explanation certainly clarifies,
if it does not justify, the stricter definition of adultery for women.
Other sorts of regulations regarding fornication have slowly disap-
peared from the Spanish statutes over the centuries. In the Partidas,
for example, there is a clear explanation of those circumstances under
which a man's having a mistress was quite acceptable (Part IV, Tit.
XIV, Law I). Since it was considered preferable to have one mistress
rather than many, the Code, clearly stated that any man who was
not married and not a clergyman could have one. There were, of
course, certain women whom it would not be proper to choose for
such a relationship (Part. IV, Tit. XIV, Laws II, III). A mistress could
not be under twelve or a virgin nor could she be a slave, prostitute,
barmaid, haggler or buffoon. She could, however, be an honest and
well-respected widow. A man was expected to announce his choice
before "good men," presumably to insure that no one else would lay
claim to his selection. One does get the feeling that a man in this
situation was going to market to pick out his goods from those
available. Needless to say, there were no such permissions and
specifications for a woman who wanted to choose goods at a similar
marketplace.
36. The theme of a man's honor being dependent in large measure on the actions
of his wife and daughters appears continually in Spanish literature from the Poem
of the Cid, through the works of the Golden Age dramatists of the seventeenth cenutry,
such as Lope de Vega, and up to the twentieth-century works of Federico Garcia Lorca.
1618 [Vol. 42
STATUS of MARRIED WOMEN
Apparently during the Renaissance, even though the practice had
been forbidden in the Partidas, a serious problem developed in Spain
with regard to clergymen having mistresses. Beginning in the
Ordenanzas Reales there was an attempt to discourage this practice,.
gently at first and then more seriously in the Novisima Recopilacin.
The Ordenanzas Reales merely states that all concubines of abbots
and clergymen had to wear "something" of vermillion-colored cloth
(Bk. VIII, Tit. XV, Law VIII). This was clearly an attempt to
discourage women from taking clergymen as lovers, but it is not clear
exactly how the measure was to be enforced. The Novisima
Recopilaci6n actually called for punishment of such mistresses (Bk.
XII, Tit. XVI, Laws III-V). The first offense called for one year's ex-
ile and a fine, while the second called for the same plus one hundred
lashes. Presumably a third offense was not expected. No punishment
whatsoever is indicated for the clergyman.
An interesting modern note regarding adultery is the fact that
the Spanish Republic in 1932 first attempted to equalize the sexes
by omitting the rule that for a husband to be condemned for such
an offense he had to have a well-known, scandalous, long-term affair.
A one-night foray would be cause enough for his punishment just as
it would for a wife. 37 Subsequently, under the Republic adultery was
completely abolished as a crime, but was reinserted in the Code dur-
ing the Franco regime.
Pinishment for Adultery
In the area of punishment for adultery or concubinage there have
been two trends in the Spanish codes. The earliest codes generally
permitted the husband of an adulteress to mete out his own justice,
while a wife's right to do the same was rarely touched on. The seventh-
century Fuero Juzgo (Bk. III, Tit. IV, Laws IV, V), for example, states
that a husband could murder both his wife and her consort, without
sanctions and that a father could do the same to an adulterous
daughter. The same law also allowed torture of servants if this would
aid in discovering the truth about his wife's adulterous activities. Fur-
thermore, the husband was entitled to the belongings of both his wife
and her consort, regardless of whether the husband decided to murder
the adulterous pair or not.
The first mention of a wife's rights in a corresponding situation
occurs in the Fuero Juzgo as well (Bk. III, Tit. IV, Law IX). However,
in each instance her rights were secondary to those of men. Only if
her husband's consort were unmarried did a wife have the legal right
to punish that woman. In such a situation the consort was turned
37. 11 BI, IOTECA JUIIDICA 622 (1927).
1982] 1619
0LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
over to the wife so that she could avenge herself as she wished. No
mention is made, however, of the wife's right to take revenge on her
own husband. To understand this one must recall the fact, discussed
earlier, that a wife in such a situation was not considered dishonored.
Considering this, it is indeed odd that she was given any right to
punish at all.
The thirteenth-century Partidas still gave the husband the primary
right to punish the adulterous pair. It began, however, to stress the
punishment of the man who had dishonored a husband and to deem-
phasize the sanctions against the adulterous wife. A husband could
kill a man whom he found in bed with his wife, but he should put
his wife in the arms of the law rather than kill her (Part. VIII, Tit.
XVIII, Law XIII). Thus, the Partidas began to mention the second
trend in punishment for adultery, which is to leave the task to the
state. This Code gave the state the power to execute an adulterer
but only to whip an adulteress in public or put her in a convent (Part.
VII, Tit. XVIII, Law XV). The punishment was less severe for women
than for men, although the wives did lose their dowries and property
to their husbands.
The Ordenanzas Reales continued the trends established in the
Partidas, while the Leyes de Toro (1505), some twenty years after the
Ordenanzas, turned further in the direction of punishment by the state.
Here a husband who killed his wife and her consort in flagrante delic-
to had no right either to the dowry or to the consort's property (as
he had under the Fuero Juzgo), but if he allowed the state to handle
the matter he was still entitled to such property (Law XXVIII). Inter-
estingly enough, the Novisima Recopilaci6n (1805) took a step
backwards, allowing a husband to punish his wife and her consort
with no mention of the state. It did provide, however, that a husband
could kill both, but not just one, of them (Bk. XII, Tit. XII, Law I).
One might say that, in light of this latter provision, there is a
semblance of equal treatment of the sexes, but again lacking is any
mention of a wife's right to punish if her husband is sexually disloyal.
A similar bias, this time in regard to inheritance, appeared in the
twentieth-century Cdigo civil (Art. 756, sect. 5) and remained until
as recently as 1978. Among those prohibited from inheriting was a
man convicted of adultery with the wife of the testator. According
to Spanish mores, this adulterer had dishonored the testator, so, of
course, the law would forbid such a man to benefit under the former's
will. No mention was made of a parallel circumstance in which a
woman might be guilty of adultery with the husband of a testatrix.
The latter was not considered dishonored by her husband's adultery
nor by her husband's consort, so why should the consort not be able
to benefit from the wife's will?
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On the surface this rule seems to be more generous to women
than to men, since an adulteress could still inherit from her consort's
wife but an adulterer could not inherit from the husband of his con-
sort. In actuality this law also worked against women considering the
fact that a husband leaving a will could not be forced to honor a man
who had dishonored him. However, a woman leaving a will could be
forced to honor a woman who had committed adultery with the
former's husband. In 1978 this section of article 756 was eliminated
and an addition was made to article 852, stating that adultery with
the spouse of the testator is considered just grounds for disinheritance.
Thus men and women leaving wills are now treated equally. Neither
is forced to make an adulterer or adulteress a beneficiary in his or
her will.
Until recently the Spanish Penal Code dealt differently with a hus-
band and wife who murdered his or her spouse in flagarante delicto
(Art. 405). If a husband committed such a murder, he was merely ex-
iled. If a wife murdered her husband under the same circumstances
she was punished with life imprisonment. In 1971, however, this arti-
cle was redrafted so that a husband received the same severe punish-
ment as his wife would for such an act. Thus only in the past decade
has a man's honor not been considered an excuse for this crime of
passion.
In other cases of adultery in which no crime of passion occurs,
from 1971 to 1978 the punishment for those committing the act had
to be requested by the aggrieved spouse and any punishment could
be meted out at the discretion of said spouse (Arts. 450-52). Previously
the Code had mentioned only the husband in these articles. However,
in 1978 those articles were totally omitted, presumably removing the
whole question of adultery from the hands of the state unless a
resulting murder were committed.
In 1981 divorce was legalized in Spain (Law 30 of July 7, 1981).38
Article 86 of this law enumerates the grounds for divorce, which, put
simply, are:
1. If the spouses have lived apart for at least one uninterrupted
year since the request for a separation decree was made by
both parties or by one party with the consent of the other
and if the request for separation was made after a year of
marriage;
2. If the spouses have lived apart for at least two uninterrupted
38. For the text of the new divorce law, see C. VAzQUEz IRUZUBIETA, REGIMEN
JURIDICO DE LA CELEBRACION Y DISOLUCION DEL MATRIMONIO 368-72 (1111) (wherein the rele-
vant portions of article 86 of this law are quoted and discussed).
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years when the petitioner affirms that when the separation
began the other spouse was opposed to it;
3. If the spouses have lived apart for at least five uninterrupted
years, no matter which spouse petitions for divorce;
4. If one spouse is convicted of making an attempt upon the life
of the other or upon his or her parents or children.
A thorough analysis of the new divorce law would require an entire
article in itself. Suffice it to say that now divorce (and therefore remar-
riage) can take place in Spain and that the grounds for divorce need
not imply that one party is at fault for not fulfilling his or her marital
duties.
WILLS AND INHERITANCE39
There existed until recently and there exist today a number of
curious restrictions upon Spanish women in the area of wills and in-
heritance. First, although women have been permitted to make wills
for some time, they were long deemed incapable of witnessing anyone
else's will. The Siete Partidas, basing its provision on Roman law,
grouped women among those persons forbidden to serve as testamen-
tary witnesses: the insane, convicts, heretics, the deaf, the mute, slaves
etc. (Part. VI, Tit. I, Law IX). Indeed, until some twenty years ago
(Civ. Code Art. 701, prior to 1958) women in Spain were permitted
to witness wills only in case of epidemic, when their services would
no doubt be desperately needed. Finally, as of 1958 the list of those
forbidden to witness wills does not include women (Art. 681).
In contrast, there is an early example of favoritism toward women
in regard to inheritance rights. The Fuero Juzgo (Bk. II, Tit. I, Law
V), the Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. XI, Law III), the Leyes de Toro (Law
III) and the Novisima Recopilaci6n (Bk. X, Tit. III, Law III, taken
directly from Law LII of the Leyes de Toro) all dealt favorably with
the woman whose fianc6 died "after the kiss" had been given-the
kiss being apparently some form of official engagement. Under the
circumstances the fiancee was allowed to keep one-half of the goods
or property her fiance was planning to give her upon the consumma-
tion of their marriage. On the other hand, if the woman died under
the same circumstances, the fianc6 was not permitted to keep any
of the dowry or any gift from his fiancee if there were one, which
was, instead, returned to her heirs. (The Partidas indicates in this
law an unlikelihood that a woman would have given her fianc6 a gift,
since women are "greedy.") In any event, the reasoning behind this
39. An analysis of the elaborate and detailed provisions of the Spanish law of
successions is not within the scope of this section. Suffice it to say that men and women
are treated equally except in the areas to be discussed.
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preferential treatment toward women might be that other men would
consider the girl, in a sense, "used," as some men do in Spain even
today, and that she would therefore find other men reluctant to pro-
pose marriage. If this were the case, the woman could then use the
portion of her fianc6's property which she was allowed to keep for
her own support and to attract other suitors. The Partidas's explana-
tion fits this interpretation: "The fiancee gives the kiss to her
betrothed, and it is not understood that she receives it from him. Also,
when the fianc6 receives the kiss, he has pleasure from it, and he
is happy, and the fiancde remains shamed" (Part. IV, Tit. XI, Law
III)." Thus the inheritance was deemed just recompense for her shame
at having given the kiss.
Such preferential treatment for women in inheritance seems to
have subsequently died out, but discriminatory provisions still remain
in this area. Women's actions have been controlled by regulating their
children's ability to inherit. First, in regard to illegitimate children,
the Novisima Recopilaci6n attempted to discourage women from
becoming clerical concubines by preventing children of such concubines
from inheriting anything from their fathers (Bk. X, Tit. XX, Law IV).
The Leyes do Toro (Law IX) and the Novisima Recopilaci6n (Bk. X,
Tit. XX, Law V) also prevented illegitimate children from inheriting
from their mother if she also had any legitimate children. In the pre-
sent Code legally recognized illegitimate children have a right to in-
herit an amount equal to half of one of the shares to which each of
the legitimate children is entitled (Arts. 840-41). Presumably, il-
legitimate children are now entitled to some inheritance so that they
are not totally punished for their parents' actions. On the other hand,
they are refused an equal share with the legitimate children of the
family, no doubt to discourage adults from bearing such children.
Regarding inheritance, an additional method by which women's
actions were influenced relates to a recently widowed woman who
says she is pregnant. This situation is governed in the Fuero Real"
and in the Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. VI, Law XVIII; Part. IV, Tit. VII,
Law III) with a complicated sequence of actions prescribed to protect
the deceased husband's relatives from deception by his widow. The
motivating suspicion is that the widow might falsely claim pregnancy
and then try to pass off another man's child as belonging to her deceas-
ed husband, for if she wer6 successful, then this child, rather than
the relatives, would stand to inherit. One reason that a false claim
40. La desposada da el beso a su espos, e non se entiende que lo recive del. Otrosi,
quando recibe el esposo el beso, ha ende plager, e es alegre, e la esposafinca enuergongada.
41. VII J. M. MANRESA Y NAVARRO, COMENTARIOS AL CODIaO CIVIL ESPAR0L 251 (7th
ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as VII MANRESA Y NAVARRO] (wherein the author refers to
Book III, Title VI, Law 3a of the Fuero Real of 1255).
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of pregnancy might have been suspected is the fact that a pregnant
wife did not automatically inherit from her husband, and if the wife
was not pregnant the husband's relatives inherited immediately (Part
VI, Tit. VI, Law XVI). With the possibility of being left without, it
is not surprising that a widow might feel resentful and stoop to
deception.
The actions required of a pregnant widow in the Partidas are par-
ticularly offensive and insulting as well as delightfully amusing. To
summarize a long series of instructions very briefly, a pregnant widow
was to show herself to the deceased's relatives twice a month so that
they could ascertain whether or not there was really a fetus. When
the birth was approaching she had to be moved into a house with
plenty of lights and only one unlocked door. Three men were assigned
to guard that door and no other women were permitted to enter. At
the time of the birth, a contingent of up to ten women could be pres-
ent, but none except the widow could be pregnant. If all relatives
were then sure that no "cheating" (substitution of another man's child)
had taken place, and if the baby was born alive, it would inherit from
the deceased father. If the baby died without baptism, the father's
relatives would inherit, and most important as a motivating force for
the entire procedure, if the infant died after baptism, the mother would
stand to inherit.
In the modern Code the spirit of protecting the deceased's relatives
remains in the form of precautions to make sure that an infant is
indeed born to the widow and that it is viable. Although still somewhat
insulting to the widow, the regulations have been modified and soft-
ened. A child born within 300 days after the end of a marriage is
presumed legitimate unless proven not to be.2 Article 959 provides
for notifying those who are in line to inherit of the pregnancy, but
article 960 leaves to the judge the decision as to what would be the
appropriate measures to prevent fraud on the part of the widow. This
article also protects the widow, cautioning: "The judge will take care
that the measures he dictates do not attack either the modesty or
the freedom of the widow."'" Article 961 provides that others in line
to inherit have the right to name a person "who will affirm the reality
of the birth" but the widow has the right to reject the person chosen,
in which event the choice is left to the judge. One nice touch is arti-
cle 964 which provides that the pregnant widow should be supported
from the inheritence for the duration of the pregnancy.
In his commentary on this subject Manresa indicates that these
42. Id. at 253.
43. Cuidard el Juez de que las 7nedidas que dicte no ataquen al pudor ni a la libertad
de la viuda.
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measures are actually designed to protect the rights of the fetus."
If the regulations are followed, the heirs are prevented from dividing
the inheritance among themselves and also from later questioning the
legitimacy of the birth. Only when the pregnancy is dubious does the
Code seem to disfavor the widow and to benefit the presumed heirs,
in Manresa's opinion. So the apparently insulting precautions can be
viewed from more than one side and are, in any case, directed at
women simply because they happen to belong to the only sex biolog-
ically capable of having children.
Women's actions have also been regulated in the past by controls
placed upon their own right to inherit. The current Code permits
parents to disinherit a daughter or niece if she has become a pros-
titute (Art. 853, sect. 3a). A similar provision can be found in the Par-
tidas (Part VI, Tit. VII, Law V). There the restriction was a bit more
ample, for it permitted disinheritance if a daughter refused to marry
the man chosen and instead became a prostitute. However, in a sense,
a daughter had more leeway then, for the provision applied only if
she were under twenty-five. The reasoning here was that if she had
become a prostitute after twenty-five it was her father's fault for not
marrying her off sooner!
GUARDIANSHIP, ADOPTION AND REMARRIAGE
The areas of guardianship and adoption in Spanish law center
around the term "patria potestad." In Roman times this expression
referred to the control which a father exercised over his children,
a control similar to that exercised by him over material things and
one which permitted a father to sell or pawn a child if necessary,
and even to eat it in an extreme case.
There were some interesting regulations in the medieval Spanish
codes regarding a widow's right to patria potestad, some of which
remained in the C6digo civil until very recently. The Fuero Juzgo,
for example, stated that a widow would normally arrange the mar-
riages of her children, but if she died or remarried (an amusing equa-
tion) this duty would be transferred to a close male relative such as
an uncle (Bk. III, Tit. I, Law VIII). The implication here is that a
wife might fall under the influence of her new husband and not do
right by her children.
Similarly, the Partidas had a provision which stated that a widow
must wait one year to remarry or else forfeit the gift given to her
44. VII MANRESA Y NAVARRO, sup(L, n. 41, at 254.
45. II J. MANRESA Y NAVARRO, COMENTARIOS AL CDIGO CIVIL ESIAIfqOI, 6-8 (7th ed.
1956).
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by the deceased when they first married (Part. IV, Tit. XII, Law III).
It must be inferred here that this rule was written to prevent a wife
from murdering her husband to remarry someone else. There is no
such restriction upon the remarriage of the husband. The law con-
tinued to single out women, stating that if a widow marries again
even after a year of mourning she cannot be a guardian to her own
children because, to paraphrase, she might consent to the death of
these children to please her new husband (Part. VI, Tit. XVI, Law
V). Again, as in the Fuero Juzgo, there exists a concern that women
might mistreat their children, by failing to ward off the evil influences
of their new husbands.
Such restrictions on women's authority over their own children
are found until quite recently. It was only in 1958 that article 168
of the Civil Code was reformed. This article had stated that a widow
who remarried lost the patria potestad over the children of her first
marriage unless her deceased husband had expressly provided other-
wise in his will. In the absence of such a provision the patria potestad
passed to a family council; as of April 24, 1968, however, it was pro-
vided that: "The later nuptials of the father or mother shall not af-
fect patria potestad, but the judge can emancipate the children over
* eighteen (over sixteen as of 1978) if they request it, with a hearing
to allow the father or mother to make his or her views known."4 This
article applies to illegitimate as well as to the legitimate children.
With reference to guardianship, the restriction already mentioned
in the Partidas (Part. VI, Tit. XVI, Law IV), whereby a widow who
remarried could not be guardian to her own children, had further
echoes in the Partidas and even in the Civil Code until recently. The
Partidas stated that a woman could not be a guardian at all unless
she was a mother or grandmother who renounced another marriage
(Part. VI, Tit. XVI, Law IV). In this century the Civil Code stated
until 1958 that women, except in cases expressly permitted by law,
could not be guardians (Art. 237, sect. 7, prior to 1958). The cases
expressly permitted included a grandmother who remained widowed,
an unmarried sister who could be the guardian of an insane person
or deaf mute and the mother of a wastrel (Arts. 211, 220, 227, prior
to 1958). In addition, until 1958 a father could name a guardian for
minor children but a mother who married for the second time could
only name such a guardian with approval of the family council (Art.
206, prior to 1958). This council, again until 1958, was formed by
members of the family as designated by the father's will, or lacking
this, as designated by male relatives (Arts. 294, 295, prior to 1958).
46. Current article 168 reads: "Las ulteriores nupcia.s dcl padre no af/ctardn a
la patria potestad, pero el Jiuez podrd conceder la emancipaci6n de los hijos mayores
de 18 aios, si lo pidieren, previa audiencia del padre o madre."
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In 1958 several significant changes were made giving women
equality in assuming guardianship. Article 237 no longer contains the
seventh case, so that women are no longer forbidden except in special
cases to be guardians. Article 206 no longer contains a paragraph speci-
fying that a woman naming a guardian for her children had to have
the approval of the family council. The composition of the family coun-
cil was also changed in 1958; article 294 now indicates that, if the
family council is not designated in a testament, it shall be composed
of the nearest relatives, of whatever sex. On the other hand, the Code
still states that in choosing among relatives of equal closeness, men
will be preferred over women (Art. 295).
One humorous situation related to guardianship was noted by the
Commission recently revising the Civil Code. As of May 1975, article
244, which had provided that those having five or more legitimate
children under their control could be excused from guardianship, was
changed so that those who have five or more children under their
control could be excused. The commission realized that whether
legitimate or not, children produce the same effect!
Adoption is another area in which women are not restricted as
they once were. In the Partidas men were permitted to adopt if older
than the child and capable of having their own, but women were per-
mitted the same right only if they had lost a son in battle or in the
king's service (Part. IV, Tit. XVI, Law ii). In such a situation women
apparently were allowed to adopt as a means of substituting another
child for the one lost. Nonetheless, even in this case the king's per-
mission was required. This requirement was not aimed at restricting
women's actions. Rather there was a feeling that, allowed to operate
on their own, women become involved in deceit: "It could be that men
might deceive women, or women men, in such a fashion that much
evil would result.""7 Why adoptions by males were not restricted for
the same reason is unclear. Present code articles 172-174 included no
prohibition of women's right to adopt. The provision that a widow
would lose the patria potestad over her children (adopted or not) upon
remarriage but would regain it upon becoming widowed again was
omitted as of 1958, so that a mother is not forced to lose this control
for reasons of remarriage.
The Law of May 13, 1982, has finally done away with the
preference given to a father in the control over his children during
a marriage. Articles 154 and 156 of this new law provide for the joint
exercise of patria potestad by both the father and the mother rather
than through the superior authority of the father. If the parents
47. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS Bk. IV. Tit. XVI. L. II: Podrii ser. que I,. V??gtn1(ri(Mn 10.
Ioles. o ellas a ellos, de ?lInlCera I/Re nvtscie'a enIde "II.'ucho vtal.
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disagree, the question can be heard by a judge and the opinion of
the child (if old enough) can be taken into account as well."
CONCLUSION
If previous reasons for restricting the rights and duties of mar-
ried women included lack of experience, the modified laws of the
Spanish C~digo civil should permit them to overcome such inexper-
ience, a situation in effect created by the limitations upon their ac-
tions imposed for centuries by the legal system. The modifications
will probably give rise to many more disputes between spouses now
that women have a somewhat stronger say in decision making. The
judges are probably finding their dockets much fuller nowadays. The
other areas where women have been treated differently from men,
such as adultery and inheritance, have been revised to treat the sexes
in an identical manner, with a few distinctions remaining mainly
because only women can bear children. Perhaps the next decade will
see further equalization of the husband and wife in the area of prop-
erty within marriage.
48. MARTINEZ-CALCERRADA, supra n. 24, at 83.
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